

What becomes of psychoanalysis in the perspective of the real unconscious?¹ Véronique Voruz²

The *Preface*, which can be said to be Lacan's second and final proposition on the pass, implies that there is a driving force for analysis which is distinct from what Lacan had initially suggested, and therefore also a different aim/end. To use Miller's terms in *L'os d'une cure* and elsewhere: an analysis at the time of the *Proposition* can be said to centre on lack-of-being, aiming at producing subjective destitution and *désêtre* as a way of separating the subject from both his alienation to the signifying chain and the recapture of some being by means of the fantasy. At the time of the *Preface*, it is no longer lack but the positivity of *jouissance* that is at stake. It implies a reconfiguration of the driving force/aim/end of analysis, reflected in Lacan's introduction of the unconscious as real (opposition sense/unconscious at the beginning of the *Preface*). I think that the unconscious as real refers to the positivity of a *jouissance* that cannot be negativised or reduced. How, then, is analysis pertinent in this perspective? Lacan gives us a clue in this text when he says satisfaction is "only attained through *use* by a person".

It reminded me that in his 1994-5 course *Silet*, Miller had phrased the question of the purpose/efficacy of psychoanalysis in very pragmatic terms. He reminds us that Freud's premise is the following: whether the subject experiences libidinal discharge as pleasurable or unpleasurable is of little relevance to the fact that each time there is a libidinal discharge, there is satisfaction. In other words, a speaking being's psychical apparatus always works insofar as a person comes to analysis with a system that works since "it enjoys itself" [*ça se jouit*]. Miller formalises the aim of an analysis, in the perspective of the positivity of *jouissance*, as a "rectification of the constant state of satisfaction", which comes to replace the production of meaning. In other words, if the subject is always happy, it is because the state of satisfaction is constant, or the system always works.

What, then, is the urgency that leads a person to analysis given the constancy of satisfaction? This question requires the introduction of a distinction between *modalities of jouissance*. For if the *state* of satisfaction is always constant, the *experience* of satisfaction can be pleasurable or unpleasurable (what Freud already called "perceptual unpleasure" in *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* [PFL 11, p. 280]). Several questions then arise: how does analysis, a practice of speech, have an effect on a subject's regime of satisfaction? Do modes of *jouissance* really transform? And what is specific to the satisfaction that verifies that an analysis has been taken to its end?

1. Product of a cartel on Lacan's "Preface to the English Edition of Seminar XI", *The Lacanian Review*, Issue No. 6, 2018, trans. R. Grigg.

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